Risk and Time Preferences

POLSCI 240 / PSY 225: Political Psychology

March 24, 2025

PoliSci Event

This week

Two fundamental “biases” in decision making

Risk aversion

Intuitively, we think we know what this is - but what is it more precisely?

Would you prefer $50 for sure, or a 50-50 chance at winning $100 or winning $0?

  • Many people are NOT indifferent: they prefer $50 for sure
  • In fact, many people will take quite a bit less than the expected value of the gamble

Risk aversion is a willingness to pay a premium for certainty

Why are people risk averse?

A common explanation points to the shape of utility functions

  • For money: concave; decreasing marginal returns to money
  • For politics: quadratic utility loss; increasing returns to ideological distance

The upshot is that people get less utility from gaining the marginal benefit than losing the marginal cost (from money, political candidates, etc.)

Risk aversion with money

Imagine the following gamble: you have $400, and I offer a 50-50 chance at winning or losing $200

Risk aversion in spatial voting models

Candidate uncertainty

Imagine you are choosing between two candidates - they both have the same expected position, but one is certain while the other is uncertain


# utility for C1
-(5 - 3.9)^2
[1] -1.21
# utility for C2
U <- function(x) {
  -(5 - x)^2 * dnorm(x, mean = 4.1, sd = 1)
}
integrate(U, lower=-Inf, upper=Inf)
-1.81 with absolute error < 1.6e-05

Status quo bias in politics

Source

Problems with simple risk aversion

People’s attitudes toward risk seem more complex than this, e.g.,

  • Is risk aversion only about decreasing marginal utility of money?

  • Is status quo bias only about quadratic loss (and what if utility loss is not quadratic?

  • The same people are sometimes risk-seeking and sometimes risk-averse

    • e.g., buy insurance and play the lottery
  • Other empirical puzzles

Disease problem

Imagine the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed.

Assume that the exact scientific estimate of the consequences of the programs are as follows:

  • If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. (72%)
  • If program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved. (28%)

Disease problem

Imagine the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed.

Assume that the exact scientific estimate of the consequences of the programs are as follows:

  • If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. (22%)
  • If program D is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that no one will die, and 2/3 probability that 600 people will die. (78%)

The endowment effect

Prospect theory

Prospect theory: 3 claims


  1. Reference dependence

  2. Loss aversion

  3. Probability weighting

Reference dependence

Carriers of value are changes from a reference point (not final wealth states), with concave function for + changes and convex function for - changes

Risk-averse in domain of gains

  • If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. (72%)
  • If program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved. (28%)

Risk-seeking in domain of losses

  • If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. (22%)
  • If program D is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that no one will die, and 2/3 probability that 600 people will die. (78%)

Loss aversion

Losses loom larger than gains: \(|U(-x)| > U(x)\)

Probability weighting

People overweight small probabilities of extreme outcomes, but are rather insensitive to moderate and high probabilities

Implications for risk taking

Imagine you have a 1 in 1000 chance to win something you value at $100

  • The expected value based on objective probability is: 100 * 0.001 = $0.10
  • The expected value based on probability weights is much higher: 100 * 0.016 = $1.60
## prospect theory transforms cumulative probabilities

# transformed probability of losing the gamble
exp(-((-log(999/1000))^0.6)) - 0
[1] 0.9842713
# transformed probability of winning the gamble
1 - exp(-((-log(999/1000))^0.6))
[1] 0.01572868

The certainty effect

Certainty is privileged!

  • The move from uncertainty to certainty has a bigger effect on decision making than one would expected based on the change in probability alone

Allais paradox


Source

Allais paradox


Source

The 4-fold pattern

Kahneman (2011)

Implications for politics

Loss aversion & status quo bias

  • incumbency advantage
  • policy inertia

Reference dependence and framing

  • Loss frames (risk-taking) vs gain frames (risk-aversion)

    • Challenger vs incumbent candidate campaigns
    • Pushes for big changes to status quo vs stability
    • Pushes for or against risky endeavors (e.g., war)

BREAK

Time preference

We say people discount the future if they are willing to pay a premium to have something sooner rather than later (holding all else equal)

  • Would you prefer to have $100 now or $110 one year from now?

We can think about different functions that determine the “present value” of some future sum

Exponential discounting

Standard rational choice approaches allow for time preference, but under an important constraint: preferences should be consistent across time

  • If I prefer $110 two years from now to $100 one year from now, I should make the same choice one year from now

This is true of exponential discounting:

  • The discounted value of some future reward is the value multiplied by a discount factor raised to the power of the time gap (D = delay) between now and then

\[ \text{U}(x_t) = \delta^{D} \text{U}(x) \]

Example

Exponential discounting


Exponential discounting has a very important property:

  • The ratio of the discount factor for any two equally spaced time points is equal
  • Your preferences are consistent across time - you don’t disagree with your future self

Agreeing with yourself

  • $75 now or $100 one period from now?
  • $75 10 periods from now or $100 11 periods from now?
  • $75 100 periods from now or $100 101 periods from now?
# discount factor ratio D = 1 vs D = 0
(0.9^1 * 100) / (0.9^0 * 75)
[1] 1.2
# discount factor ratio D = 11 vs D = 10
(0.9^11 * 100) / (0.9^10 * 75)
[1] 1.2
# discount factor ratio D = 101 vs D = 100
(0.9^101 * 100) / (0.9^100 * 75)
[1] 1.2

People do disagree with themselves across time!!!

Hyberbolic discounting

Hyperbolic discounting is an alternative theory for representing time preferences

  • People have a strong bias toward the present
  • This bias is such that there is conflict between present and future selves
  • People care much more about an immediate delay than they care about future delays of equal length

\[ \text{U}(x_t) = \left( \frac{1}{1 + \delta D} \right) \text{U}(x) \]

Example

Fighting with yourself

  • $75 now or $100 one period from now?
  • $75 10 periods from now or $100 11 periods from now?
  • $75 100 periods from now or $100 101 periods from now?
# discount factor ratio D = 1 vs D = 0
((1 / (1 + 0.9*1)) * 100) / ((1 / (1 + 0.9*0)) * 75)
[1] 0.7017544
# discount factor ratio D = 11 vs D = 10
((1 / (1 + 0.9*11)) * 100) / ((1 / (1 + 0.9*10)) * 75)
[1] 1.223242
# discount factor ratio D = 101 vs D = 100
((1 / (1 + 0.9*101)) * 100) / ((1 / (1 + 0.9*100)) * 75)
[1] 1.320276

This inability to resist immediate rewards for longer-term gain is often understood as a problem of willpower

Being a good citizen

ChatGPT 4o

Being a “good citizen” perhaps involves doing small things on a regular basis, none of which are as fun as the alternatives

  • Reading long-form news articles
  • Watching debates
  • Researching candidates
  • Fact-checking

Discounting the past and future

In each question, you will be able to indicate which combination of temporary jobs created this year and five years from now you think represents the best economy. Some people might think the best economy would create all temporary jobs now even though that would mean higher unemployment five years from now. Other people may think the best economy would create all temporary jobs five years from now even though that would mean higher unemployment now. Still others may think the best economy would divide the number of jobs created between the two periods in some way.